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Self-Image Motives and Risk Preferences in Charitable
Behavior
Judd Kessler & Jeffrey Yang
1 Introduction
In the field of psychology, self-image has been proposed as an important motivator in social
behavior (Bem, 1972; Baumeister, 1998). Such theories posit that individuals are unable to
perfectly introspect their traits or dispositions, and must infer these impressions of their own
actions; an individual who has preferences over his own traits or dispositions would thus act
in such a way as to manage these self-impression. Such theories have since been formalized
in economic models. Bodner & Prelec (2003) and Benabou & Tirole (2006) propose models
in which agents have preferences over their inner traits or dispositions, which govern their
distributional preferences but can only be inferred from their decisions.
These models of self-signaling are readily applied to charitable giving and other forms of
prosocial behavior because of the inherent tradeoff between material outcomes and a pos-
itive self-signal in such behaviors. Consider the dictator game, in which a participant is
given a monetary endowment and can share any amount of it with an anonymous recipient.
Observed positive rates of giving in dictator games have been explained by outcome-based
theories of inequity aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Fehr & Schimdt, 1999), and al-
truism (Charness & Rabin, 2000), and theories involving social norms and social signaling
(Andreoni & Bernheim, 2009; DellaVigna, List, & Malmendier, 2009). Self-signaling theories
provide yet another explanation for positive give rates in these games otherwise selfish indi-
viduals may substitute their own payoff with a positive self-signal by giving positive amounts
to the recipient, because they wish to believe they are altruistic or prosocial.
Experimental evidence of self-signaling in charitable giving has typically focused on in-
formation avoidance, a set of behaviors in which individuals avoid learning, or pay to avoid
learning, the outcomes of self-serving decisions that have the possibility of harming another
(Dana, Weber & Kuang, 2007; Feiler, 2014). The fact that individuals strongly prefer to
avoid information that could harm their self-image is consistent with models of self-signaling
(Prelec & Prelec, 2010). Self-signaling behavior suggests that individuals are unable to
perfectly introspect their true level of altruism or prosociality, and thus have incentives to
protect these impressions by avoiding information, even if such avoidance comes at a cost.
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Prior work has attempted to elicit more direct experimental evidence of self-signaling in
charitable behavior, the focus of this paper. Murnighan, Oesch, & Pillutla (2001) find that
individuals are more selfish in a dictator games when given a restricted choice set of alloca-
tion amounts, and argues that these results are due to a disposition effect in how individuals
interpret their own behavior. Tonin & Vlassopoulos (2013) find that subjects opt out of a
probabilistic decision to give ex post and argue that this reflects a reduced signaling benefit
stemming from the satiation of self-image motivation, as well as the increased cost of giving
ex post, while Grossman (2015) tests the performance of social signaling and self-signaling
models in explaining a probabilistic dictator game. In this body of work, evidence for self-
signaling remains less conclusive; while Muringhan et al (2001) and Tonin & Vlassopoulos
(2013) derive findings consistent with self-signaling, while Grossman (2015) fails to find sig-
nificant results consistent with self-signaling models, and finds stronger evidence for social
signaling models.
In this paper, we develop a simple model of an agent with concerns about both fairness
and self-image, and derive behavioral predictions from the model to inform an experimental
framework to discriminate between various models of charitable behavior. In particular, we
show how self-image concerns can explain preference for probabilistically ”mixing” outcomes
with different fairness implications. Concretely, consider a dictator game in which a subject
is given $x and has a ”selfish” and a ”fair” option: keep all $x for himself, or make a 50−50
split with the recipient, and who prefers a lottery over his option outcomes (e.g. letting a coin
flip decide) over either outcome for certain. This behavior cannot be explained by outcome-
based models of charitable behavior. Intuitively, an agent who has preferences over only
the payoff outcomes to himself and others should either prefer $x to himself or the 50− 50
split; the only case where a preference for mixing could be rationalized in an outcome-based
model is if the agent is indifferent between the two. The fact then, that experimental studies
have documented evidence of such behavior amongst a substantial fraction of the subject
population (Sandroni, Ludwig, & Kircher, 2013), shows that a purely outcome-based model
cannot be a descriptive model of social choice.
If self-image considerations are allowed to enter the model, however, this mixing behavior
can be easily rationalized. For an intuitive explanation, consider a selfish agent who in the
absence of self-image concerns would prefer to choose the selfish outcome of $x to himself.
By choosing a probabilistic mix of the fair and selfish outcomes, such a subject can take
a loss in expected payoff, but in the process avoid an overly harsh interpretation of their
self-image. In the same vein, our self-signaling model predicts that agents will effectively
trade off monetary gain for a better self-image, which gives rise to the mixing of choices that
experiments have documented.
In addition to developing a model of self-signaling to explain this puzzling behavioral
phenomenon, we contrast the predictions of our self-signaling model with the predictions
of ex-ante fairness models, another class of models developed to explain a preference for
mixing in social choice (Fudenberg & Levine, 2012). Ex-ante fairness models assume that
individuals do not evaluate the fairness or other desirable attributes of individual outcomes
within a lottery, but rather the fairness attributes of the expected value over the outcomes.
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With some other assumptions, such a model could explain a preference for mixing. We show
how a self-signaling model can capture certain behavior that cannot be explained by ex-ante
fairness models, and develop a novel experimental framework to distinguish the two models
based on these model predictions.
This paper extends the growing theoretical literature on self-signaling models of social
choice by examining the predictions of a self-signaling model in a novel choice domain, and
by showing how a self-image model can provide an intuitive explanation for several puzzling
behavioral phenomena that cannot be captured by other models of social choice. Further-
more, this paper aims to bridge theory and experimental approaches within the study of
social choice by proposing a simple experimental framework, based on the predictions of a
model, by which to discriminate self-signaling models from other models proposed in the
literature.
Section 2 develops a simple model of an agent with both inequity-averse material prefer-
ences and self image motives. Section 3 describes the proposed experimental framework and
further directions for this study. Proofs and extensions are collected in the Appendix.
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2 The Model
In this section we develop a model of an agent who has both preferences over material
outcomes and self image, who faces a decision that affects the payoffs to both himself and
a recipient. We then compare predictions made by our signaling model to a model of ex-
ante preferences. Our model is based on the self-signaling framework proposed in Bodner
& Prelec (2003), in which an individual’s total utility is comprised of both outcome utility,
or preferences over material outcomes, and diagnostic utility, the agent’s preferences for self
image. We adopt Fehr & Schmidt (1999) inequity aversion to model the agent’s outcome
utility.
2.1 Experimental Environment
Consider a dictator who chooses the probability of a gamble between two outcomes that
result in different monetary allocations (d, r) paid to himself, d, and the recipient, r. The
gamble is between a fair and a selfish outcome.
Formally, we consider a fair outcome (df , rf ), a selfish outcome (ds, rs), such that
ds > df = rf > rs, and some gamblep between the two, characterized by a probability p,
that results in fair with probability p, and selfish with probability 1− p.
Finally, we allow for a minimum contribution level p to be imposed on the agent’s choice, so
that [p, 1] represents the agent’s choice set.
2.2 Preferences
The agent’s preferences is described by two components: outcome utility and diagnostic
utility.
Outcome Utility:
For an allocation (d, r), the dictator’s outcome utility increases in his own payoff d, and
decreases in the degree of advantageous inequality between his and the recipient’s payoff
d− r1:
u(d, r) = d− β(d− r),
β ∈ [0, 1).
We only consider advantageous inequality, governed by β, since in all possible outcomes
d ≥ r. We assume the most natural extension of these preferences to uncertain outcomes,
the expected utility framework, so that
u(gamblep) = (1− p)u(ds, rs) + pu(df , rf )
1For simplicity, we assume linear inequity aversion. See Appendix B for an extension of the model to
non-linear preferences.
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Diagnostic Utility:
The dictator also has preferences, modeled by a meta-utility function V (β), over his dispo-
sition towards generosity captured by β. We assume that V (β) is strictly increasing in β, so
that the agent derives greater diagnostic utility from a belief that he is generous.
At the time of the decision, the agent’s outcome utility is governed by his true β dispo-
sition, but in inferring his disposition the true value of β is unknown to the agent; his beliefs
over β must be updated from his actions. These updated beliefs are given by the interpre-
tation function f(β|a, C), which gives the probability that the agent the agent assigns to
possessing β, given an observed action a from a choice set C.
The agent’s diagnostic utility is thus given by∫ 1
0
V (β)f(β|a, C)dβ.
Total Utility:
Total utility is given by
U(a, β, C) = u(a) + λ
∫ 1
0
V (β)f(β|a, C)dβ,
Where the signaling motive λ ≥ 0 parameterizes the relative weight the agent places on
diagnostic utility.
For our experimental environment, in which the dictator chooses a probability p for a gamble
between two allocations rather than the allocations themselves, total utility as a function of
choice p is given by
U(p, β, C) = (1− p)[ds − β(ds − rs)] + pdf + λ
∫ 1
0
V (β)f(β|p, C)dβ.
Interpretations and Equilibrium:
To complete the model, we need to specify the interpretation function f(β|a, C), which char-
acterize the agent’s beliefs over his β type given an observed action. To do this, we use an
equilibrium approach in which both the agent’s actions and interpretations f(β|a, C) are
determined simultaneously in a signaling equilibrium.
Informally, our agent is described by an action function that maps types β to actions, and an
interpretation function f(β|a, C) that, given an action and accompanying choice set, gives
the probability of the agent possessing type β, such that
(1) Actions are optimal (in terms of total utility) given interpretations, and
(2) Interpretations are consistent with Bayes’ rule and the action function.
The use of Bayes rule requires the agent to have a prior belief distribution over his type
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β, which we denote by f(β). We assume that f(β) has full support over some interval [0, x]1,
where x is chosen in the unit interval so that the agent’s prior beliefs do not preclude any
interpretations associated with equilibrium actions.2
Histories of actions: One might wonder why the interpretation function f(β|a, C) only
takes into account the agent’s current action a, rather than the agent’s history of actions;
the prior belief distribution f(β) might also depend on the agent’s history of actions as well.
From a modeling perspective, we do not allow for this possibility as our model would lose
much tractability and predictive power - in practice, it is difficult or impossible to know
the agent’s entire history of past actions. Our simplifying assumption is also motivated by
behavioral intuition: it is well documented in the psychological literature on memory that
individuals are best able to recall recent items, with recall ability decaying with temporal
distance - even within the frame of an experiment only minutes long (Deese & Kaufman,
1957).
It is thus reasonable to make the assumption that the agent’s interpretations take into
account his current action only, and the assumption that the agent’s belief distribution ex-
hibits drift: that it reverts to the same prior distribution over following a decision. 3
Psychological interpretation of self-signaling games: In this paper we adopt the lan-
guage of signaling games. We discuss what actions a continuum of ”players” with different
types β would make in equilibrium, considering the actions of all other players. In reality,
there is only one corporeal ”player”, the agent making the decision of which probability to
choose, who is uncertain about his/her own inherent generosity β and aware of his/her own
signaling motive λ. When making the decision, the agent does not actually play against
other physical agents, as the language might suggest; the agent instead plays against a con-
tinuum of imagined, counterfactual versions of themselves possessing the same λ, which the
agent knows, but with varying β values, which the agent is unsure about.
The decision process underlying these signaling games can be summed up in the following
thought exercise: I know my signaling motive λ, but am unsure about my inherent generosity,
β. In interpreting an action I might make, I will then ask myself: how generous would I
need to be (β), given how much I know I care about self image (λ), for me to find that action
optimal?
1Alternatively, we could assume the prior belief distribution is discrete as is often the case in the signaling
literature, in which there is only a ”High” and a ”Low” type rather than a continuum of types. See Appendix
B for a discussion on this alternative approach.
2Formally, this means that x ≥ β¯. See Section 2.3: Solving for Equilibrium for a definition of β¯.
3This second assumption is not crucial to our method for estimating λ, which is valid even if the agent’s
prior belief distribution is impacted by past actions - so long as the agent’s prior exhibits the full support
assumption. This is so the agent’s interpretations do not preclude any value of non-pooling β ex-ante.
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2.3 Solving for Equilibrium
We propose a partially separating equilibrium, in that those with types β > β¯ pool at p = 1,
the most fair option, and the remaining types β ≤ β¯ choose p ∈ [p, 1) such that actions are
perfectly revealing of types. We now introduce some notation to characterize our equilibrium:
(1) An action function p∗(β), which maps each type β to an action p. Note that by our
proposed equilibrium, p∗(β)=1 for β > β¯ (pooling). We normalize our action function by
assuming that the lowest type β = 0 chooses the most selfish option, p = p.
(2) A diagnostic function D(p) that returns the diagnostic utility associated with making an
action p. That is:
D(p∗(β)) =
V (β) p
∗(β) < 1∫ 1
β¯ V (β)f(β)∫ 1
β¯ f(β)
p∗(β) = 1
To understand the nature of the diagnostic function D(p∗(β)), note that for pooling types
β ≤ β¯, actions are perfectly revealing of types, so the diagnostic utility the agent receives is
simply V (β). For pooling types, Bayes rule and the action function yields∫ 1
0
V (β)f(β|p = 1) =
∫ 1
β¯
V (β)f(β)∫ 1
β¯
f(β)
for the prior belief distribution f(β). Now we can re-write the agent’s utility function as
U(p, β) = (1− p)[ds − β(ds − rs)] + pdf + λD(p)
We now sketch a solution concept for finding equilibrium in our model. Recall that finding
equilibrium involves specifying D(p∗(β)) and p∗(β) such that equilibrium conditions hold,
and finding β¯. First, we will analyze equilibrium outcomes for non-pooling types, who have
β ≤ β¯.
We start by taking the FOC’s with respect to the choice p:
∂D
∂p
=
1
λ
[ds − df − β(ds − rs)] (1)
Differentiating the diagnostic function D(p∗(β)) = V (β) with respect to p on the non-pooling
domain, we obtain
∂D
∂p
∂p∗
∂β
= V ′(β). (2)
Substituting the expression for ∂D
∂p
from the FOC’s, we have
∂p∗
∂β
=
λV ′(β)
ds − df − β(ds − rs) (3)
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To solve for p∗(β), we integrate from 0 to β, obtaining:
p∗(β) =
∫ β
0
λV ′(β)
ds − df − β(ds − rs) + p (4)
Note that the above formulation for p∗(β) applies only to non-pooling types for which β ≤ β¯;
for pooling types, p∗(β) = 1.
To obtain the diagnostic function D for non-pooling types, we first solve (4) for the true inter-
pretation β|p = p∗(β). The diagnostic function for non pooling types is then V (β|p = p∗(β)).
Finally, we need to solve for β¯, the cutoff type point for pooling/non-pooling in equilib-
rium. We conjecture that this β¯ to be the type that is indifferent between pooling and not
pooling, so we construct the following equality:
U(p∗(β¯), β¯) = U(1, β¯) (5)
Which we can then solve for β¯. We have now fully specified equilibrium. For a proof that our
solution concept indeed produces an equilibrium, see ”Verifying Equilibrium” in Appendix
A. We now discuss several results from our equilibrium.
Result 1: For non-pooling agents, p∗(β) is increasing in β.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This is in line with our intuitions: an individual with a greater concern for fairness (higher
β) has less to lose in the outcome domain from selecting a fairer gamble and relatively more
to gain in the diagnostic domain.
Result 2: For non-pooling agents, p∗(β) is increasing in λ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Intuitively, an individual with a greater signaling motive (higher λ) will have harsher inter-
pretations of his own actions; thus to maintain true interpretations in equilibrium, such an
agent must choose a relatively fairer gamble.
2.4 A Concrete Example
For the remainder of the paper, we simplify analysis by considering concrete example, in
which we assume V (β) = β and that the prior belief distribution f(β) is uniform over the
unit interval.
In this case, the equilibrium action function is given by:
p∗(β) =
−
λ ln[1−β ds−rs
ds−df
]
ds−rs + p β ≤ β¯
0 β > β¯
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and the interpretation function is given by:
D(p∗(β)) =

(ds−df )
(ds−rs) [1− exp(−
(ds−rs)(p∗(β)−p)
λ
)] p∗(β) < 1∫ 1
β¯ βf(β)∫ 1
β¯ f(β)
p∗(β) = 1
For derivations of these functions, see ”Equilibrium in Concrete Model” in Appendix A.
Finally, we need to solve for β¯, the cutoff type point for pooling/non-pooling in equilib-
rium. We construct the following equality:
U(p∗(β¯), β¯) = U(1, β¯)
We cannot obtain a closed-form solution for β¯, but the problem can be solved numerically.
Figure 1 plots β¯ against the agent’s λ for a specific gamble. Here we see the intuitive result
that as the signaling motive λ increases a larger fraction of agents begin to pool, with a
complete pooling equilibrium once λ > 0.1.
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Figure 2 illustrates the intuitive result that in equilibrium, choices of p closer to 1 can-
not be supported, as agents who choose high p would find it optimal to trade off a small
amount of outcome utility in order to pool with higher types at p = 1.
Commenting on the nature of the curve: we observe the expected result that for small
values of λ, few types pool, with most types choosing relatively low p. As λ increases, we
expect to observe two opposing effects: (1) non-pooling agents have a greater signaling mo-
tive, and so find higher values of p optimal, and (2) higher type agents begin to pool out,
leaving the non-pooling segment with progressively lower β types, who find lower values of
p optimal. In Figure 2 we can observe both effects; as λ moves from low to moderate levels,
the first effect dominates the second, and when moving from moderate to high λ the second
effect dominates the first.
2.5 Preference Identification
Here, we generate predictions of behavior in our experimental environment from the signal-
ing model developed in this section, and compare them to predictions generated from an
alternative model of ex-ante inequity aversion. From these predictions we show how agents
with ex-ante fairness preferences can be identified from agents with self-signaling preferences
through a simple experimental mechanism: varying the minimum contribution probability, p.
Before we proceed, we must specify a general model of ex-ante inequity aversion.
Ex-Ante Preferences
As is standard in proposed models of ex-ante fairness preferences (Fudenberg & Levine,
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2012; Trautmann, 2009), our agent has inequity averse preferences over the expected value
of gambles, rather than over the expected utility of gambles. To illustrate this, in our ex-
perimental environment, let E(d|p) = pdf + (1 − p)ds, the expected value of the dictator’s
payoff, and let E(r|p) = prf + (1 − p)rs, the expected value of the recipient’s payoff. the
dictator’s utility, according to linear would be defined by
U(p) = E(d|p)− β[E(d|p)− E(r|p)]
Note that while this specification alone does not predict interior values of p being chosen
(unless the dictator is indifferent between the two outcomes) due to the linear nature of
Fehr-Schmidt preferences, a more flexible specification of inequity aversion can easily allow
for choices of p on the interior. We will henceforth assume such a specification, in which
utility is given by
U(p) = u1(E(d|p))− βu2[E(d|p)− E(r|p)]
where u1 and u2 are both increasing functions. Now, given a set of two outcomes, the agent
chooses p to equate the marginal utilities du1
dp
and β du2
dp
, which could allow for choices of p on
the interior.
Now that we have specified a model of ex-ante inequity aversion, we examine
Model Predictions
We now examine how changes in the minimum contribution level, p, holding all else equal
in our experimental environment, affect interior choices of p for agents with preferences de-
scribed by the two competing models. To make things concrete, we analyze what an agent
who chooses an interior level of p in a setting with no minimum contribution level will choose
in a setting with a minimum contribution level of p > 0, holding all else equal.
Self Signaling: Consider an agent with self-signaling preferences who chooses p∗ in the
absence of a minimum contribution level. Recall that in our concrete model, the optimal
choice of interior (non-pooling) p∗ is given by
p∗ = −
λ ln[1− β ds−rs
ds−df ]
ds − rs + p
So it is clear that raising the minimum contribution level from 0 to p will produce two pos-
sible effects: either the agent chooses p∗ + p, or pools at p = 1.
Ex-Ante Fairness: Consider an agent with ex-ante fairness preferences who chooses p∗
in the absence of a minimum contribution level. Recall for this agent, the optimal choice of
interior (non-pooling) p∗ equalizes the marginal utility of the agent’s own wealth du1
dp
, and the
marginal disutility of inequity β du2
dp
. As such, we see that raising the minimum contribution
level from 0 to p will produce two possible effects: either the constraint imposed by the
minimum contribution level is slack (p ≤ p∗), in which case the agent’s optimal choice of p∗
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is left unchanged, or the constraint is binding (p > p∗) in which case the agent’s optimal
choice of is exactly the minimum contribution, p.
So we see that the two models generate starkly different predictions as to how the agent will
react to a minimum contribution level. In principle, this difference will allow us to identify
ex-ante fairness from self-signaling preferences in subjects who choose interior probabilities,
on the individual level.
3 Experimental Framework & Further Directions
In this section we outline a simple experimental framework by which to discriminate a self-
signaling model from a model of ex-ante behavior in explaining preferences for probabilistic
mixing. The proposed design draws heavily on the predictions in Section 2.5. We also discuss
further avenues of research within the domain of this study.
3.1 Experimental Framework
In Section 2.5 we showed how both a self-signaling and ex-ante fairness model can explain
a preference for choosing p on the interior, but that both models generate starkly different
predictions as to how an agent will react to a change in the minimum contribution level,
p. An ex-ante fairness model predicts that the an agent who chooses p∗ prior to a change
in constraint will either continue to choose p∗ if the new constraint is slack, or choose p if
the new constraint is binding, while a self-signaling model predicts that an agent will either
increase his/her contribution exactly by p and choosing p∗ + p, or pool at p = 1.
This impulse response of p to the minimum contribution level p has an intuitive expla-
nation. Consider a selfish but image-concerned agent who chooses p∗ = .3, when there is no
minimum contribution level p = 0. By giving up some expected payoff, such an agent is able
to achieve a moderately positive interpretation of his own type, since he is far more generous
than his most selfish hypothetical type, who chooses p∗ = 0. Now consider what happens
when p = 0 is raised to 0.3. Now the agent can no longer receive a positive interpretation
of β by continuing to choose p∗ = .3, since he is giving the same amount he would if he
were completely selfish. So the agent must choose a higher p to maintain his self-image
interpretation; in our model the agent would switch to p∗ = 0.6.
On the other hand, a model of ex-ante fairness has no such considerations. In this model,
an agent faced with a choice problem has a p∗ that optimally trades off the utility from a
higher expected payoff to himself with the disutility from a higher expected level of inequity
between himself and the recipient, and wishes to choose as close to this optimum as possi-
ble. As such, this model mechanically precludes the context-based effects that we see in a
self-signaling model.
An experimental framework based on these contrasting predictions is outlined below:
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Subjects play two rounds of a probabilistic dictator game with two binary outcomes: a
selfish outcome (where $x is given to the subject) and a fair outcome (where $x is split evenly
between the subject and a recipient, another subject in the study; the subject chooses p in
each round, the probability that the fair outcome is implemented.
To eliminate any confounds relating to social-image concerns, it is communicated to each
subject that the dictator game is private, meaning that the recipient in each case is unaware
of the choices made by the subject, and unaware that a game is even being played. Further-
more, to help mitigate order effects and wealth effects, only one of the two rounds of the
study is randomly selected for incentivization at the end of the experiment, meaning that
subjects are incentivized to treat each round independently.
Both dictator game rounds are identical except for the value of p, the minimum contribu-
tion level. In one of the rounds (which appear in random order), p = 0, and in the other p > 0.
This framework allows for us to test for the presence of preferences for mixing, even
in the absence of social image considerations. One could plausibly imagine that subjects
prefer to let chance decide outcomes with different fairness implications because they care
about what others think. By making the dictator game private, we rule out this explanation,
which to our knowledge has not been documented in the literature. Second, conditional on
subjects mixing and choosing p on the interior, this framework allows us to discriminate
between the ex-ante fairness and self-signaling models by observing how subjects’ choice
of p varies between the two rounds. Furthermore, because subjects play both rounds, this
framework allows us to identify subjects with self-signaling preferences from subjects with
ex-ante preferences on an individual level. In this way our framework contributes to the
experimental literature by providing a design that allows for individual-level identification of
self-signaling preferences, when many existing experimental frameworks are equipped only
to examine between-treatment group effects.
3.2 Further Directions
To continue this study, we plan to launch the experimental framework outlined above to see
which theories the empirical evidence supports.
In terms of theory, there also remains work to be done. Though our self-signaling model
provides simple, interpretable predictions, its simplicity results in several stark predictions
that will not likely be observed in practice. For example, the model predicts that subjects
will react to a change in minimum contribution level ∆p by changing their choice of p by
exactly ∆p, while it is likely that this impulse response varies by individual. Furthermore,
the model’s function specification makes it difficult to estimate and identify parameters. As
such, the self-signaling model as it currently stands serves only as a guide to provide insight
into behavioral patterns of giving, rather than an empirical tool. Further research should
involve examining the assumptions of the model with the aim of making it more flexible in
its predictions, and more tractable from an empirical standpoint.
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Appendix A: Proofs and Derivations
Verifying Equilibrium
We now show that the action function p∗(β), diagnostic function D(p) and pooling cut-off β¯
we obtained in Section 2.3 constitute an equilibrium.
First, it is clear that condition 2 of equilibrium is satisfied; interpretations are consistent
with the action function and with Bayes’ Rule. To verify this, examine the diagnostic func-
tion formulated in section 2.3:
D(p∗(β)) =
V (β) p
∗(β) < 1∫ 1
β¯ V (β)f(β)∫ 1
β¯ f(β)
p∗(β) = 1
All non-pooling types are correctly identified, and all pooling types are assigned diagnostic
utility of a conditional expectation consistent with Bayes’ rule.
All that’s left is to check that condition 1 is satisfied: that given the interpretation function,
the action function maximizes utility for all types. Before this, however, we establish two
propositions useful in our analysis:
Proposition 1. For agents adhering to our proposed equilibrium functions with p∗(β) < 1,
total utility decreases in β.
Proof. For our proposed equilibrium functions, total utility for non-pooling types is given
by:
U(β) = (1− p∗(β))[ds − β(ds − rs)] + p∗(β)df + λV (β)
= df + (1− p∗(β)) · [ds − df − β(ds − rs)] + λV (β)
Differentiating with respect to β, we obtain
∂U
∂β
= −∂p
∗
∂β
[ds − df − β(ds − rs)]− (1− p∗(β)) · (ds − rs) + λV ′(β)
= −λV ′(β)− (1− p∗(β)) · (ds − rs) + λV ′(β) by substituting (3) for ∂p
∗
∂β
= −(1− p∗(β)) · (ds − rs)
And so ∂U
∂β
< 0 so long as p∗(β) < 1.
Proposition 2. p∗(β¯) ≤ 1 for true interpretations.
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Proof. For type β¯, we have
U(p∗(β¯), β¯) = U(1, β¯)
(1− p∗(β¯)) · [ds − β¯(ds − rs)] + p∗(β¯)df + λV (β¯) = df + λ
∫ 1
β¯
V (β)f(β)∫ 1
β¯
f(β)
(1− p∗(β¯)) · [ds − df − β¯(ds − rs)] = λ[
∫ 1
β¯
V (β)f(β)∫ 1
β¯
f(β)
− V (β¯)]
p∗(β) = 1−
λ[
∫ 1
β¯ V (β)f(β)∫ 1
β¯ f(β)
− V (β¯)]
ds − df − β¯(ds − rs)
Note if interpretations are true, then we have
λ[
∫ 1
β¯
V (β)f(β)∫ 1
β¯
f(β)
− V (β¯)] ≥ 0
since for true interpretations the conditional belief distribution f(β|p = 0) exhibits ∫ 1
β¯
f(β|p =
0) = 1, and so the conditional expectation
∫ 1
β¯ V (β)f(β)∫ 1
β¯ f(β)
=
∫ 1
β¯
V (β)f(β|p = 0) ≥ V (β¯).
We also have that ds − df − β¯(ds − rs) > 0 is positive whenever β¯ < ds−dfds−rs . Note that
it cannot be the case that β¯ ≥ ds−df
ds−rs ; such types strictly prefer pooling since their outcome
utility is maximized when p = 1, whereas type β¯ must be indifferent between pooling and
not pooling.
Therefore, we guarantee that
λ[
∫ 1
β¯
V (β)f(β)∫ 1
β¯
f(β)
−V (β¯)]
ds−df−β¯(ds−rs) ≥ 0 and subsequently p∗(β) ≤ 0.
Now we proceed to show that the action function is optimal for all types, given the inter-
pretation function. We divide our analysis to three categories of types: those with β = β¯,
those with β < β¯, and those with β > β¯.
(1) β = β¯ (Indifferent Non-Pooling Agents)
Recall that by Proposition 2, agents of this type choose some interior probability p∗(β).
By definition, agents of this type are indifferent between pooling and not pooling, so the
agent has no strong incentive to deviate from equilibrium by pooling. Furthermore, we
know that the interior probability of p∗(β) maximizes utility compared to all other interior
choices of p, since in our equilibrium approach, p∗(β) equates the marginal outcome utility
to marginal diagnostic utility. Thus the agent with type β¯ has no incentive to deviate from
equilibrium by choosing another interior probability.
(2) β < β¯ (Non-Pooling Agents)
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Again, our equilibrium approach guarantees that these non-pooling agents have no incentive
to deviate from equilibrium by choosing an interior probability other than p∗(β), which is
guaranteed to be less than 1 by Proposition 2 and the observation that p∗(β) strictly in-
creases in β (see Appendix A, Proofs of Results 1 and 2). By Proposition 1 and Proposition
2, we have that for types β < β¯,
U(p∗(β), β) > U(p∗(β¯), β¯) = U(1, β¯).
Since for our interpretation function
U(1, β¯) = df + λ
∫ 1
β¯
V (β)f(β)∫ 1
β¯
f(β)
= U(1, β)
we have that U(p∗(β), β) > U(1, β) for non-pooling agents. Thus, these agents have no
incentive to deviate from equilibrium by pooling.
(3) β > β¯ (Pooling Agents)
If agents of these types deviate from equilibrium by choosing an interior probability, the
probability they choose will be precisely p∗(β), the choice that equates marginal outcome
and diagnostic utility (note that if p∗(β) ≥ 1, these agents will find p = 1 optimal regardless,
and so will not deviate from equilibrium). By Proposition 1, we have
U(p∗(β), β) < U(p∗(β¯), β¯) = U(1, β¯) = U(1, β)
for β > β¯. Thus agents of this type have no incentive to deviate from equilibrium by choos-
ing an interior probability.
Proofs of Results 1 and 2
Result 1: For non-pooling agents, p∗(β) is increasing in β.
Proof. From (3), we know that ∂p
∗
∂β
> 0 if β <
ds−df
ds−rs , a condition that is met for all non-
pooling agents.
Result 2: For non-pooling agents, p∗(β) is increasing in λ.
Proof. Differentiating p∗(β) in (4) with respect to λ, we obtain
∂p∗
∂λ
=
∫ β
0
V ′(β)
ds − df + β(ds − rs)
Since the integrand is strictly positive over the domain of non-pooling types with β <
ds−df
ds−rs ,
it follows that ∂p
∗
∂λ
> 0.
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Equilibrium in the Concrete Model
Here we solve for equilibrium equilibrium action and interpretation functions for the concrete
model in Section 2.4.
First, we will analyze equilibrium outcomes for non-pooling types, who have β ≤ β¯. From
(4) in Section 2.3, we obtain the following expression for the action function:
p∗(β) =
∫ β
0
λ
ds − df − β(ds − rs) + p
p∗(β) = −λ ln[ds − df − β(ds − rs)]
ds − rs
∣∣∣β
0
+ p
p∗(β) = −
λ ln[1− β ds−rs
ds−df ]
ds − rs + p
To obtain the diagnostic function D for non-pooling types, we solve the action function for
β in terms of the equilibrium action, p∗(β), obtaining
D(p∗(β)) = β|p
=
(ds − df )
(ds − rs) [1− exp(−
(ds − rs)(p∗(β)− p)
λ
)]
We now have the following action function:
p∗(β) =
−
λ ln[1−β ds−rs
ds−df
]
ds−rs + p β ≤ β¯
0 β > β¯
and the following interpretation function:
D(p∗(β)) =

(ds−df )
(ds−rs) [1− exp(−
(ds−rs)(p∗(β)−p)
λ
)] p∗(β) < 1∫ 1
β¯ βf(β)∫ 1
β¯ f(β)
p∗(β) = 1
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Appendix B: Extensions to the Model
Equilibrium with Binary Types
We now examine an equilibrium outcome under the assumption that the agent’s prior belief
distribution f(β) places positive probability for only two types, βH and βL such that
f(β) =
{
βH with probability γ
βL with probability 1− γ,
and
βL < βH <
ds − df
ds − rs .
The high-type cares more about fairness than the low type, but neither type cares enough
to find prefer placing all probability on the fair gamble in lieu of any signaling motive. We
introduce some notation to characterize equilibrium:
(1) An action function p∗(β), which maps each type β to an action p:
p∗(β) =
{
pH β = βH
pL β = βL
(2) A diagnostic function D(p) that returns the diagnostic utility associated with making an
action p. That is:
D(p) =

V (βH) p = pH 6= pL
V (βL) p = pL 6= pH
γV (βH) + (1− γ)V (βL) p = pH = pL
The first two interpretations correspond directly to the action function when no pooling
occurs, while the last interpretation corresponds to a situation where high and low types
pool, and is consistent with Bayes’ rule.
We can now re-write the agent’s total utility function as
U(p, β) = (1− p)[ds − β(ds − rs)] + pdf + λD(p)
Equilibrium Refinements
Note that the action function and Bayes’ rule alone produce a diagnostic function agnostic
about off-equilibrium actions p 6= pH 6= pL. Thus a multiplicity of equilibria are valid, de-
pending on how we specify off-equilibrium interpretations.
To sharpen the predictive power of the model, we use Bodner and Prelec’s Plausibility
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Criteria. To state the criteria, we first define the notion of plausibility: for some action p′
and type β, plausibility is given by
P (p′, β) = U(p′, β)−max
y
U(y, β).
That is, plausibility refers to the difference in utility from an action p′, and the maximal
utility from the action y. We can now state the Plausibility Criteria, which requires that:
The Plausibility Criteria: Interpretations of off-equilibrium actions should assign posi-
tive probability only to types that have the greatest plausibility with respect to those actions.
Intuitively, if a type β benefits the most (or suffers the least) from moving from his op-
timal action y to the off-equilibrium action p′, then the only valid interpretation of that
action must be β. Also, note that as a necessary result of equilibrium, for high types the
optimal action is given by y = pH , and for low types the optimal action is given by y = pL.
We start by analyzing off-equilibrium actions p′ < pH . Plausibility for type βL is given
by U(p′, βL) − U(pL, βL). It is then clear that plausibility for type βL must be less than or
equal to
U(p′, βL)− U(pH , βL)
= (1− p′)[ds − βL(ds − rs)] + p′df + λD(p′)− (1− pH)[ds − βL(ds − rs)]− pHdf − λV (βH)
= (pH − p′)[ds − df − βL(ds − rs)] + λD(p′)− λV (βH)
Since the optimality condition of equilibrium ensures that U(pL, βL) is utility maximizing
for type βL. Plausibility for type βH is given by
U(p′, βH)− U(pH , βH)
(1− p′)[ds − βH(ds − rs)] + p′df + λD(p′)− (1− pH)[ds − βH(ds − rs)]− pHdf − λV (βH)
= (pH − p′)[ds − df − βH(ds − rs)] + λD(p′)− λV (βH)
Recalling that p′ < pH , and βL < βH , we have the inequalities
U(p′, βH)− U(pH , βH) < U(p′, βL)− U(pH , βL)
U(p′, βH)− U(pH , βH) < U(p′, βL)− U(pL, βL)
P (p′, βH) < P (p′, βL)
for all p′ < pH . Since our equilibrium places higher plausibility on βL for these off-equilibrium
actions, the Plausibility Criteria states βL must be the correct interpretation for p
′ < pH .
An analogous argument for off equilibrium actions p′ > pH yields the result that P (p′, βL) <
P (p′, βH), and so βH must be the correct interpretation for these actions. Also excluded for
brevity’s sake is analysis that shows for pooling equilibria, the Plausibility Criteria generates
the same interpretations of off-equlibrium actions.
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We have now accounted for all off-equilibrium interpretations. The refined diagnostic func-
tion is given by
D(p) =

V (βH) p ≥ pH
V (βL) p < pH
γV (βH) + (1− γ)V (βL) p = pH = pL
Solving for Equilibrium
Thus far, we have proposed an action function p∗(β), and defined an diagnostic function
D(p) that takes into account interpretations consistent with the action function. To solve
for equilibrium, we must solve for pH and pL in the action function. We now develop several
propositions to pin down pH and pL.
Proposition 1. pL ≤ pH
Proof. Consider an equilibrium where pL > pH . Then the low type can unilaterally improve
both outcome and diagnostic utility by pooling at pH , so pL > pH cannot be an equilibrium
outcome.
Proposition 2. If pL 6= pH , pL = p
Proof. Assume an equilibrium where pH ≥ pL > p. Since such an action function leads to a
separating equilibrium, the low type is correctly identified; his utility is given by
(1− pL)[ds − βL(ds − rs)] + pLdf + λV (βL)
It is also true that
(1− pL)[ds − βL(ds − rs)] + pLdf + λV (βL) <
(1− p)[ds − βL(ds − rs)] + pdf + λV (βL) + λD(0).
If the low type chooses off-equilibrium at p = p, the lowest possible contribution level, he
improves his outcome utility and cannot worsen his diagnostic utility, since in equilibrium he
is established as the lowest type. Thus the low type strictly prefers p = p to an equilibrium
of pH ≥ pL > 0.
Proposition 3. If pL = pH , pL = pH = 1
Proof. Assume an equilibrium where pL = pH < 1. It is true that for some ∆, the high type
will have
(1− pH)[ds − βH(ds − rs)] + pHdf + λ(γV (βH) + (1− γ)V (βL))
< (1− (pH + ∆)) · [ds − βH(ds − rs)] + (pH + ∆)df + λV (βH).
That is, high types can improve utility by accepting a infinitesimally small decrease in
outcome utility to separate themselves from the low types. Thus a pooling equilibrium can
only be supported when pL = pH = 1.
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We first analyze a separating equilibrium, where pL 6= pH . By Proposition 2, we know
pL = p. We conjecture that a value of pH solves the equilibrium, such that the low types
are indifferent between imitating the high type by choosing p = pH and choosing p = p. We
construct this equality and solve for pH :
(1− p)[ds − βL(ds − rs)] + pdf + λV (βL) = (1− pH)[ds − βL(ds − rs)] + pHdf + λV (βH)
(6)
pH [ds − df − βL(ds − rs)] = p[ds − df − βL(ds − rs)] + λV [(βH)− V (βL)]
(7)
pH = p+
λ[V (βH)− V (βL)]
ds − df − βL(ds − rs) (8)
Thus, for this value of pH , low types have no strong incentive to deviate from choosing
pL = 1. We now need to verify that high types have no incentive to deviate from pH .
Given that high types are already correctly identified at pH , they can only worsen their
outcome utility while gaining no diagnostic utility by choosing p > pH . On the other hand
if a high type abandons the good signal by choosing p < pH , he will choose p = p, the
least generous option. To show that this action is suboptimal, we start with the equality
established in (6):
(1− p)[ds − βL(ds − rs)] + pdf + λV (βL) = (1− pH)[ds − βL(ds − rs)] + pHdf + λV (βH)
Now if we substitute βH for each βL in the above expression, we obtain the inequality
(1− p)[ds − βH(ds − rs)] + pdf + λV (βL) < (1− pH)[ds − βH(ds − rs)] + pHdf + λV (βH)
U(p, βH) < U(pH , βH)
Thus, our conjecture for pH works and we have found equilibrium.
Note some intuitive properties of pH : it is increasing with λ, meaning that an agent with
a greater signaling motive must act more generously to signal to himself he is of the high
disposition. Furthermore, pH increases as the gap between βH and βL increases, meaning
that a high type will incur greater material loss to secure his interpretation if the alternative
interpretation worsens. Finally, note that as in the continuous types model, pH increases
with the minimum contribution level, p.
Finally, the expression for pH tells us exactly when pooling at p = 1 occurs: when λ or
p is large enough so that the expression for pH becomes greater than 1. Since pH is bounded
at 1, this means that there is no choice of pH high enough for which the low types won’t join
with the high types.
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Functional form of Fehr & Schmidt Preferences
Throughout our analysis we modeled outcome utility with linear Fehr & Schmidt preferences.
We now show our equilibrium results are robust to relaxing these assumptions on functional
form. In his axiomatic approach to modeling inequity aversion, Nielson (2006) characterizes
Fehr & Schmidt preferences by the axiom of self-referent separability, and shows that this
axiom holds for the functional form
u(d, r) = u1(d)− u2(d− r)
We adopt this functional form to model outcome utility and operationalize it to our problem
by introducing the β parameterization of advantageous inequality, so that
u(d, r) = u1(d)− βu2(d− r),
where u1(d) is increasing in d and u2(d − r) is increasing in d − r. Total utility in our
experimental setting is thus given by
U(p, β) = (1− p)[u1(ds)− βu2(ds − rs)] + pu1(df ) + λD(p)
Because additive separability in the dictator’s payout and the level of inequality is preserved
in Neilson’s axiomatic approach, our approach to formulating an equilibrium is essentially
unchanged. We can simply proceed to the analysis of non-pooling outcomes equilibrium
functions in the same fashion outlined in Section 2.3, and then solve for β¯.
24
